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The real point of magic . . . is ‘telling a beautiful lie. It lets you see 
what the world would be like if cause and effect weren’t bound by 
physics.’ It’s the collision between what you know and what you 
see that provides magic’s greatest spark. 
—Teller1 
 
The schism between knowing and seeing may be magic’s allure, but when 
the magician sees a fellow entertainer perform his signature trick, he wants to 
know that the law affords him protection.2 Law, like magic, revolves around 
expectations.3 Magic defies one’s expectations, but law secures them.4 Yet, in 
the realm of copyright law, magicians’ expectations for protection are unclear.5 
As a teenager, Raymond Joseph Teller, of Penn & Teller, envisioned an 
illusion never before seen.6 He perfected the trick, and it became known as his 
signature “Shadows.”7 In the trick, a vase with a rose rests upon a stool and its 
shadow projects onto a wall.8 Teller, the “murderer,” approaches the shadow 
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with a knife, and, as he cuts the petals of the shadow, the real rose petals fall.9 In 
1983, after performing the trick for about seven years, Teller submitted it for 
copyright registration, using a cartoon-like diagram with a description of the 
setting, characters, and action.10 In copyrighting his illusion, he attempted to 
protect his labor without revealing the secret behind the act.11 
Until 2012, Teller was the only person to have performed this trick.12 In 
that year, however, the video “A Rose & Her Shadow” appeared on YouTube.13 
In the video, Gerard Dogge (alias Bakardy of Los Dos de Amberes) used a knife 
to cut a projected rose’s shadow.14 Dogge allegedly figured out the secret behind 
Teller’s trick and either devised another way to create the illusion or used video 
editing to make an audience believe that he could perform the trick.15 Dogge 
concluded the video with an offer to sell the trick’s secret for 2,450 Euros 
($3,050).16 After a failed attempt to negotiate with Dogge, Teller sued him for 
copyright infringement.17 
Teller’s case represents two emerging legal complexities—the struggle to 
protect the intellectual property of untraditional artistic creations, like magic and 
the growing difficulty of preventing artistic replication.18 This case includes 
many interesting facets such as Dogge’s defamation countersuit in Belgium, 
issues related to moral and derivative rights, a failed negotiation, and a 
defendant who all but disappeared.19 The primary focus of this paper, however, 
is Teller’s copyright infringement claim. Part I addresses the current law 
surrounding copyright protection of magic and the performance arts. Next, Part 
II lays out the facts of Teller’s case. Finally, Part III discusses Teller’s 
likelihood of success considering the case precedent he must overcome. 
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I. COPYRIGHT LAW 
As great as Teller’s shadow trick is, it may be an even larger feat to 
prevail on a copyright infringement claim to protect his magic illusion.20 
Traditionally, magicians have self-policed through a code of honor.21 For 
example, another performer once stole Teller’s “Turning coins into goldfish” 
illusion, but he was able to reach an arrangement with the performer and 
successfully keep the issue out of the court system.22 Such a gentleman’s 
remedy, however, is no longer strong enough due to the rapidly developing 
means of replication and dissemination. With over “thirteen hours of video . . . 
uploaded to YouTube every minute,” performance entertainers face the 
possibility that infringement could reveal their secrets much more quickly than 
before, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of an honor code.23 Magicians can 
instantly lose control over not only the secrets behind their magic tricks, but of 
their entire craft with just the click of an “upload” button.24 Consequently, in 
addition to the traditional code of honor, stronger protection through copyright 
law is needed.25 
Current copyright law, however, does not afford sufficient protection for 
magicians.26 Because performance art did not receive full protection until the 
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 and litigation is costly, copyright case 
law offers little guidance on an infringement claim pertaining to magic tricks.27 
Accordingly, one legal scholar and magician, Sara J. Crasson, surveyed federal 
intellectual property rights laws as well as state laws and found them inadequate 
to protect magicians and other performance entertainers.28 Another author, 
Michael Carroll, declared that “[p]erformance of illusions and magic tricks 
appears to be a borderline case for which copyright’s role is evolving and rights 
of creative control are not yet fully specified.”29 Therefore, copyright law must 
evolve to include protection in accordance with the needs of performance 
entertainment.30 
  
 20 Gardner, supra note 10. 
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 30 See generally Crasson, supra note 21. 




A. The Legal Standard and Analysis 
Copyright law has largely developed independently of performance 
entertainment.31 That generic standard requires that the plaintiff must first show 
that he has copyrighted the material.32 Copyrighted material only includes the 
execution of an idea, rather than an idea alone.33 The plaintiff must then show 
that the defendant copied his protected original work.34 To prove this second 
element, he will need to demonstrate that the works are substantially similar and 
that the defendant had access to his protected work.35 This test helps distinguish 
generic elements from actual imitation.36 Much of the copyright case law turns 
on the plaintiff’s burden to prove substantial similarity and access as well as the 
defendant’s defenses.37 
First, substantial similarity depends on the likeness of certain elements.38 
The Ninth Circuit, which includes the District of Nevada court presiding over 
Teller’s lawsuit, adopted a two-part test for extrinsic and intrinsic similarity.39 
Under the extrinsic evaluation, the court compares elements like “setting, theme, 
character types, and plot structure.”40 In addition, the Ninth Circuit in Metcalf v. 
Bochco concluded that the sequence of the work could indicate substantial 
similarity.41 The decision further established that the amount of similar elements 
indicates a “pattern.”42 
Subsequently, however, courts have interpreted Metcalf narrowly and 
determined that a pattern of similarity alone may not suffice to show substantial 
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the Air? Recent Developments in the Law of Ideas, 51 IDEA 111, 119 (2011). 
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 35 Thomas, supra note 32, at 30. 
 36 See id. 
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 40 Id. at 30, 32; see also Hong, supra note 32, at 44. 
 41 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Thomas, 
supra note 32, at 32. 
 42 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1074; Siprut, supra note 33, at 120. 





similarity.43 For example, in Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., Rice, a magician, accused 
Fox of infringing his home-video production that revealed the secrets behind 
well-known magic tricks.44 In the 1980s and 1990s, Rice established a niche in 
the home-video market as the Mystery Magician, who revealed magic trick 
secrets in a series of videos.45 Then, in the 1990s, Fox developed a show, 
Specials¸ in which a masked magician revealed secrets behind magic tricks.46 
Rice attempted to establish infringement based on the similarity that both shows 
revealed secrets.47 
The Ninth Circuit evaluated “the stylistic elements,” such as a masked 
magician that Rice’s expert testified was unique.48 Rice, however, did not 
prevail because the elements of a masked magician, a revelation of secrets, and a 
misty set were too generic: “there are only a finite number of ways to reveal the 
secrets behind magic tricks.”49 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
there were not enough similar elements in hand to meet the “totality of 
similarities” test in Metcalf.50 In fact, the court’s rejection may indicate that it 
was not willing to construe a pattern of similarities as infringement and that the 
test, while it has not been expressly abrogated, is too uncertain to apply to other 
cases.51 According to the Los Angeles Lawyer in 2005, “Metcalf has not been 
followed by a single published Ninth Circuit decision upholding a copyright 
infringement claim . . . based on an allegedly protectable arrangement or pattern 
of generic elements that were individually unprotectable.”52 Thus, an argument 
that two works are substantially similar based on a similar sequence of elements 
is unlikely to prevail.53 
The intrinsic test complements the extrinsic test by reframing the analysis 
based on an “ordinary reasonable audience[‘s]” perception of the work.54 While 
the Second Circuit is merely persuasive authority in Teller’s case, it offers an 
analogous analysis for a similar type of artistic work.55 Similar to the Ninth 
Circuit, the Second Circuit applies the same tests to determine substantial 
similarity.56 For example, in Horgan v. MacMillan, the estate of George 
Balanchine sued a company for publishing a book that allegedly infringed on 
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 55 See generally Horgan v. MacMillan, 789 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 56 See Hong, supra note 32, at 37. 




copyrighted choreography.57 This Second Circuit case followed the substantial 
changes to the 1976 Copyright Act that added choreography (and magic), and 
appears to be one of the few cases where the court specifically applied a 
substantial similarity inquiry to a performance entertainer’s copyright claim.58 
The copyright claim in Horgan focused on defendant’s organized 
photographs of Balanchine’s choreographic work.59 Allegedly, these photos 
copied and conveyed the choreography in a “different medium.”60 Balanchine’s 
estate claimed that the book infringed upon the copyright because it was 
substantially similar to Balanchine’s choreography because it “portray[ed] the 
essence of the Balanchine Nutcracker.”61 The defendant, however, claimed that 
choreography entails a “flow of movement[s]” and that photographs cannot 
replicate the movement.62 Furthermore, the defendant argued that many of the 
photographs were already in the “public domain” and, therefore, did not 
constitute infringement.63 Without deciding the case on its merits, the Second 
Circuit remanded the case, indicating that infringement would be possible even 
through different mediums of expression if the “quantity [and] sequencing” of 
the photographs amounted to a substantially similar display as the dance.64  
Horgan’s analysis under the intrinsic analysis of the substantial similarity 
test was rather similar to the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic analysis of a pattern of 
similar elements in Metcalf.65 Although from a different circuit than Teller’s 
lawsuit, Horgan may show that in the case of choreography, pantomime, and 
magic, courts are willing to focus on a pattern of similarities.66 Although Rice 
might appear to preclude this type of inquiry, Rice is distinct from a 
performance entertainer’s case, such as Teller’s, because Rice still constituted a 
copyright claim more similar to literature.67 Rather than claiming that another 
entertainer stole his illusion, Rice sought protection from the courts about a 
scripted and traditional form of entertainment.68 Thus, it appears that the Ninth 
Circuit has yet to address a copyright claim about magic or other pantomime.69 
  
 57 Horgan, 789 F.2d at 160; see also Anne K. Weinhardt, Note, Copyright 
Infringement of Choreography: The Legal Aspects of Fixation, 13 J. CORP. L. 839, 844 
(1988). 
 58 See generally Horgan, 789 F.2d at 157. 
 59 See generally id. 
 60 Id. at 158, 162. 
 61 Id. at 161. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 162. 
 64 See id. at 163. 
 65 Compare id. with Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 66 See Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1069; see also Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 
1170 (9th Cir. 2003). See generally Horgan v. MacMillan, 789 F.2d 157, 157 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
 67 See generally Rice, 330 F.3d at 1170. 
 68 See generally id. 
 69 See generally id. 





Accordingly, Horgan’s approach of reviewing the overall circumstances may be 
appropriate.70  
Second, in addition to demonstrating substantial similarity between the 
plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s alleged copy, the plaintiff also must show 
that the defendant had access to his work.71 Under the Ninth Circuit’s “inverse 
ratio rule,” the plaintiff has a “lower standard of proof” for substantial similarity 
if he can also show that the defendant had access to his work.72 In Metcalf, the 
court found it dispositive that the defendant had seen the work more than once 
and therefore, the plaintiff was relieved of his burden of fully proving 
substantial similarity.73 
Finally, a typical copyright infringement claim also affords the defendant 
several possible defenses: the merger doctrine, the scenes à faire principle, and 
the “‘independent creation’ defense.”74 Under the merger doctrine, a defendant 
is not liable if the idea only has one form of expression.75 In such a case, the idea 
merges with the expression and neither will merit copyright protection.76 
Crasson suggested that “juggling a bowling ball, a chainsaw and a hedgehog 
cannot be copyrighted” nor could the performance of that act because of the 
merger doctrine.77 Meanwhile, the scenes à faire principle stipulates that certain 
types of expression are inherent to the idea and, therefore, do not merit 
protection.78 For instance, “pulling a rabbit out of a hat” is so generic to a magic 
trick that it would not constitute infringement.79 Finally, the defendant can also 
attempt to show that he created his work without copying the plaintiff’s work 
under the “independent creation defense.”80 If the defendant independently 
created an act similar to the plaintiff’s act, infringement of the plaintiff’s work 
did not occur even if he reduces the novelty of it.81 Thus, a claim for copyright 
infringement imposes a fairly high burden on the plaintiff who must demonstrate 
copying through substantial similarity and access while also negating any 
defenses put forward by the defendant.82 
  
 70 See Crasson, supra note 21, at 113. See generally Horgan, 789 F.2d at 157. 
 71 Rice, 330 F.3d at 1178 (citations omitted); Thomas, supra note 32, at 34; see also 
Siprut, supra note 33, at 117. 
 72 Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 
Thomas, supra note 32, at 34; see also Siprut, supra note 33, at 121, 126. 
 73 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Siprut, supra 
note 33, at 121. 
 74 Thomas, supra note 32, at 30; Hong, supra note 32, at 45. 
 75 Thomas, supra note 32, at 30. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Crasson, supra note 21, at 117. 
 78 Thomas, supra note 32, at 30. 
 79 Crasson, supra note 21, at 85. 
 80 Hong, supra note 32, at 45. 
 81 Weinhardt, supra note 57, at 842–43. 
 82 See generally discussion supra notes 38–81 and accompanying text. 




B. Magic Under Copyright Law 
The previously discussed legal standard and analysis has largely 
developed independent of and without accounting for the elements of 
performance entertainment that copyright law should protect.83 Although the 
1976 Copyright Act accounts for tangible expressions of variety and magic acts 
under its pantomime and choreography provision, the case law tends to 
disregard these forms of entertainment.84 Despite this apparent divorce between 
the statute and actual protection, magic and intellectual property rights have a 
common root that would make magic a natural object for protection.85 
Magic and intellectual property rights share the same foundational logic.86 
Although the United States codified copyright law in 1909 and subsequently 
amended it in 1976, legal anthropologists contend that copyright and intellectual 
property rights hark back to traditional cultures and ritual magic.87 Ritual magic 
represented a means for an individual to explain a beneficial discovery without 
foregoing the opportunity to capitalize on it by revealing his secret.88 
Accordingly, a farmer who discovered a simple process involving fish that 
yielded a better crop could only capitalize on the discovery if he kept the precise 
process a secret.89 To do so, he employed magic’s primary tool of misdirection.90 
Rather than revealing the secret, he could claim that his ritual contributed to the 
crop yield.91 He secured a role for himself and a means to profit.92 Similar to 
copyright law, ritual magic constituted a means to protect a creation.93 Although 
magic shares such a common logic with intellectual property law and could be a 
natural object for its protection, intellectual property protection has not yet 
extended to it.94 
  
 83 Id. 
 84 Crasson, supra note 21, at 83. See generally Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 
102(a)(4), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (2012)). 
 85 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”); see Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: 
Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and Intellectual Property in Preliterate Societies, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1273–75 (1989). See generally Crasson, supra note 21. 
 86 See Suchman, supra note 85. 
 87 See id.; see also W. Ron Gard & Elizabeth Townsend Gard, The Present (User-
Generated Crisis) Is the Past (1909 Copyright Act): An Essay Theorizing the 
“Traditional Contours of Copyright” Language, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455, 488 
(2011). 
 88 See Suchman, supra note 85, at 1273–75. 
 89 Id. at 1274–75 (describing in depth the example of a farmer using ritual magic to 
maintain the value of his discovery and labor). 
 90 See id. at 1273–75. See generally Macknik, supra note 3. 
 91 Suchman, supra note 85, at 1273–75. 
 92 Id. at 1275–76. 
 93 See id. at 1276. 
 94 See Crasson, supra note 21. See generally Suchman, supra note 85, at 1276. 





While the policy behind copyright law establishes the basis for protecting 
magic, the manifestation of the principles through case law fails to account for 
magic’s creative contributions.95 Copyright policy dictates that the law must 
protect artistic or innovative expression because it contributes to society.96 
Accordingly, case law helps to incentivize authors to continue creating literature 
by protecting original expression such as plot, characters, and action.97 Case law, 
however, does not provide the same incentives for performance art because their 
artistic contribution does not rest solely upon the already protected and defined 
elements of plot, character, and action.98 Instead, a performance’s creation is 
much more nebulous.99 
Protecting magic illusions under copyright law challenges the common 
understanding of an entertainment piece’s value and creation.100 A good illusion 
continues to defy expectations because the audience either does not know the 
secret, or cannot comprehend the trick despite knowing the secret.101 For 
example, Penn & Teller revealed the secret behind the famous cups-and-ball 
trick, yet the illusion was still valuable because the audience’s eyes could not 
follow the movement and the mind remained bewildered.102 While magic may 
offer some indirect value through traditionally protected elements such as video 
sales and trick licensing, the predominant value rests upon deceiving the 
audience’s minds.103 Deception involves an idea for the trick, the equipment and 
props, the presentation, the misdirection and timing of the misdirection, the 
secret, and the perfection in drawing it all together.104 Thus far, copyright law 
has failed to adequately protect this type of artistic creation because it does not 
protect the comprehensive performance.105 
The documented intellectual property rights cases involving magic 
performance attempt to frame the performance in terms of traditional copyright 
claims, detaching them from their value.106 Yet, magic performers, for their part, 
have yet to present cases that fully challenge the courts’ perceptions.107 In one of 
the earliest intellectual property rights cases about magic (a patent case), the law 
failed to fully protect the genius behind magic.108 By trying to conform to the 
  
 95 See generally Crasson, supra note 21. 
 96 Id. at 81. 
 97 See Carroll, supra note 29, at 799–802. 
 98 See generally Macknik, supra note 3. 
 99 See generally id. 
 100 See generally Crasson, supra note 21. 
 101 See generally Macknik, supra note 3. 
 102 Id.; Lehrer, supra note 6 (explaining that Teller used clear cups and explained how 
the trick was done, but rather than ruining the trick, more people clamored to see it). 
 103 See Exhibit 10 for Defendant, Teller v. Dogge, No. 2:12-cv-00591-JCM-GWF (D. 
Nev. Oct. 21, 2012). 
 104 See generally Macknik, supra note 3. 
 105 See generally Crasson, supra note 21. 
 106 See discussion infra notes 108–127 and accompanying text. 
 107 See discussion infra notes 108–127 and accompanying text. 
 108 See generally Goldin v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 22 F. Supp. 61, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 
1938). 




law, the magician lost the value of his trick when he revealed the secret.109 In the 
1920’s, Horace Goldin patented the equipment for his illusion of “sawing a 
woman in half.”110 Problematically, patents are public information and a tobacco 
company snatched his invention for an advertising campaign.111 The company 
featured Goldin’s invention on a cartoon strip.112 Goldin naturally sued, but lost 
because the information was already public.113 Goldin’s case signaled to 
magicians that there might be a trade-off between protecting their creation and 
maintaining its value.114 
A later case in the 1940s further narrowed the legal protection afforded 
magicians and specifically focused on the copyright of magic.115 The case 
implied that copyright protection might only exist for magicians in theory 
because the court could not conceive of creation in comprehensive terms beyond 
literature-like elements.116 In this case, Charles Hoffman sued a fellow magician 
for stealing his act.117 Back in the 1930s and 40s, Hoffman was a Vaudevillian 
regular.118 The public knew him for an act he called “think-a-drink” in which he 
requested the audience to write down a desired beverage. Without seeing the 
drink order, Hoffman would produce the drink including “zombies” and ice 
cream sodas.119 For this trick, he was known as “the highest paid bartender in the 
world.”120 Originally featuring the trick as part of a performance with a 
monologue about prohibition, he modernized and perfected the trick.121 He made 
the act famous, but he did not create the trick unlike Teller.122  
He sued another performer, Glazer of ‘Bill Jordan’s Bar of Music’ for 
infringing upon his act.123 The other magician used the exact same monologue 
  
 109 Id. at 65; see also Crasson, supra note 21. 
 110 Goldin, 22 F. Supp at 63; see also Crasson, supra note 21, at 109. 
 111 Goldin, 22 F. Supp. at 62; see also Crasson, supra note 21, at 109. 
 112 Goldin, 22 F. Supp. at 61. 
 113 Id. at 65; see also Crasson, supra note 21, at 109. 
 114 See Crasson, supra note 21, at 109. See generally Goldin v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 22 F. Supp. 61, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). 
 115 See generally Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 809 (1943). 
 116 See id.; see also Crasson, supra note 21, at 98–99. 
 117 See Glazer, 153 Fla. at 811. 
 118 Crasson, supra note 21, at 98. 
 119 Glazer, 153 Fla. at 811. Zombies are a drink made of various types of rum and 
pineapple and papaya juice. Zombies, ESQUIRE, http://www.esquire.com/drinks/zombie-
drink-recipe (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). To watch Hoffman perform the trick, please see 
Think A Drink Hoffman, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=okGBeX-BTD8 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2012). 
 120 FRANK CULLEN, VAUDEVILLE OLD & NEW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VARIETY 
PERFORMERS IN AMERICA 518 (Psychology Press, 2004). 
 121 See Steve Cohen, Think-A-Drink  ̧STEVE COHEN’S CHAMBER MAGIC BLOG (Dec. 10, 
2009), http://www.chambermagic.com/think-a-drink/. 
 122 Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 809, 812 (1943). 
 123 Id. at 811. See generally Crasson, supra note 21, at 99. 





and illusion with the same devices.124 Glazer ultimately prevailed on defending 
his performance, although not the use of the speech.125 He defended himself by 
waging that the trick was scenes à faire similar to pulling a rabbit out of the hat 
and known to many magicians.126 The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the 
defendant that the illusion did not belong exclusively to Hoffman because he 
had simply performed, but did not create it.127 These early intellectual property 
rights cases about magic undervalued its creative contribution and failed to 
comport with the principles of copyright law. They did not, however, 
specifically address the scenario in which the performer created and scripted the 
trick, as epitomized in Teller’s case. 
II. TELLER’S LAWSUIT & LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
Despite unfavorable case precedence, the time is ripe for the courts to 
adjust the way copyright law as it pertains to performance entertainment is 
analyzed. Teller’s lawsuit represents an ideal opportunity for the Ninth Circuit 
because not only did Teller invent the illusion, but he also obtained a copyright 
on it.128 Additionally, as an expert on magic, who has contributed to publications 
about magic’s cognitive aspects, he can explain the value behind a magic 
performance.129 His case overcomes the defects of earlier cases sufficiently to 
challenge the courts to reconsider how they analyze creation and expression.130 
While he might be able to satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s traditional copyright test 
and show substantial similarity because he documented the characters, setting, 
and plot for his illusion, he may still struggle with overcoming the scenes à faire 
defense.131 Even though his claim represents a best-case scenario for applying 
the traditional test to a magic illusion, his creation, like many other performance 
entertainers’ work, cannot easily be reduced to the traditional test.132 Therefore, 
although he should argue the traditional test, his success will also likely depend 
on the persuasiveness of his copyright policy arguments.133 
A. Background on Teller’s Lawsuit 
Teller’s lawsuit arose only after he tried to pursue a magician’s 
agreement.134 After a friend alerted him to the YouTube video, Teller began to 
seek remedies.135 First, he used a “DMCA takedown notice” to remove the video 
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from YouTube.136 Second, Teller offered to pay Dogge to keep the illusion a 
secret.137 As part of the industry’s custom of self-policing, he offered Dogge 
$15,000, reasoning that he would normally pay an assistant $7,500 to help him 
develop a mechanical apparatus for a trick.138 In his letter to Dogge, Teller 
indicated that his offer included payment for the device and a non-compete-
type-of agreement precluding Dogge from using the trick and sharing the know-
how with anyone else.139 Although he recognized Dogge’s efforts, he expressed 
displeasure to even offer money for “something that should not have been done 
without [his] consent in the first place.”140 Dogge, however, held out for 
$125,000.141 Teller found the counter-offer unreasonable and filed copyright 
infringement and unfair competition claims on April 11, 2012.142 
Dogge’s response to the lawsuit is almost a magical illusion in itself, with 
the District Court of Nevada unable to confirm his “whereabouts” or 
citizenship.143 Dogge, however, knows about the lawsuit, as he has filed a 
defamation lawsuit in Belgium in reaction to it and has responded to Teller’s 
complaint.144 In his response, Dogge begins by indicating his lack of 
representation, mastery of the English language, and knowledge of the American 
judicial system.145 Full of conclusory statements, he offers some quirky 
allegations, but hardly provides a legal defense.146 His claims include statements 
that he did not violate Teller’s copyright because his video only received 
fourteen views; that Teller could not possibly prove injury because he received 
“free publicity”; and that he did not have notice of Teller’s copyright because 
Teller is a libertarian.147 Each of these assertions is illogical and irrelevant to 
copyright law.148 His clearest argument appears to be that Teller did not properly 
copyright his work or somehow contributed to the infringement because he did 
not make the copyright known with the display of a copyright symbol.149 As a 
live performance, it is not clear how a display of the copyright symbol would 
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function.150 Regardless, display of a copyright symbol is not necessary or even 
dispositive of a copyright.151 Thus, in over forty-pages of response, it does not 
appear that Dogge has substantiated any type of legal defense.152 Nonetheless, 
copyright law imposes the burden on the plaintiff to prove the copying.153 
B. Merits of the Lawsuit 
Although Teller characterized his reluctance to litigate to protect his 
signature trick as a civilized gesture in the realm of noble magicians, he may 
have realized that his legal battle would be more of a “gamble” than his 
proposed settlement.154 Policy considerations and a broader construction of 
copyright law, especially under the substantially similar test as the Second 
Circuit found possible with dance choreography, will be Teller’s greatest 
arguments.155  
Teller may have difficulty proving substantial similarity under the 
standard analysis.156 The ideas are similar, and Dogge even insinuates the 
likeness in his advertisement, suggesting his trick was modeled after the “great 
Penn & Teller [performance of] a similar trick.”157 As copyright law does not 
protect ideas, however, the court’s inquiry will turn on whether the expression is 
substantially similar.158 Teller included in his copyright a detailed description of 
the setting, characters, and action.159 Under the extrinsic inquiry, these literary 
elements may suffice to show substantial similarity.160 Nonetheless, the Court 
may conclude that the elements with a dark stage and a spotlight are still too 
generic, akin to the Hoffman analysis.161 Under the intrinsic test, Teller can 
assert that Dogge’s act is substantially similar based on an “essence” analysis 
under Horgan.162 Although courts have been reluctant to apply this argument 
after Metcalf, magic is analogous to choreography and Horgan appears to be the 
only case on point.163  
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Teller likely also needs to show that Dogge had access to his act because 
his argument may not be strong enough on substantial similarity alone.164 The 
parties dispute whether Dogge actually has seen the act live.165 Even if Dogge 
had seen the act live, however, it is not clear that access to viewing the illusion 
will suffice for infringement because the court might reason that Dogge needed 
access to the secret to infringe upon the copyright.166 
Because Teller may not even reach the intrinsic element under the 
traditional test, his likelihood of success depends largely on the persuasiveness 
of his policy arguments.167 The current standards for evaluating copyright 
infringement are simply a poor fit for magic because the objective criteria is 
difficult to apply and when courts try to apply it, they often overlook the artistic 
expression and value in magic.168 Teller needs to convince the District Court of 
Nevada that he, other magicians, and performers need copyright protection, and 
the current standard represents but an illusion of protection for them.169 Instead, 
the court should adopt a test that recognizes the value behind the magic and 
performance similar to the Horgan test of “essence” or the Metcalf “totality of 
similarities” test.170 If there is any case for a court to set precedence for magic as 
entertainment under copyright law, this is the ideal case.171 
CONCLUSION 
Although there have been but a few magic cases to appear before courts, 
Teller’s lawsuit may be a bellwether case for copyright protection of 
performance entertainment.172 A court opinion that fails to account for the 
creation of magic as a comprehensive performance or the value of the secret 
behind the magic trick is not in line with the spirit of the Copyright Act.173 In 
breaking away from the magician’s code of honor to police his or her own kind, 
Teller has presented a gift of opportunity to the court to reevaluate its copyright 
law standard for performance entertainment, and particularly magic.174 The case 
presents the ideal situation, with the plaintiff securing copyright protection of his 
illusion without disclosing the secret behind it.175 The plaintiff also serves as an 
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authority on the cognitive value of magic illusions, as well as a master of the 
craft.176 If any plaintiff can educate the court on the “creation” of magic, that 
which copyright law should protect, it would be Teller. Perhaps Teller’s lawsuit 
is just another one of his illusions to lead the court to the conclusion that he 
desires: protection for the magic community.177 
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